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Digest: Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership
Benjamin Price

Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J., Baxter, J., and Corrigan, J.
Dissenting Opinion by Werdegar, J. Dissenting Opinion by Moreno, J.,
with Kennard, J. and Werdegar, J.
Issue
Are nonemployer individuals personally liable for their role in
retaliation for which the employer is liable under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) 1?
Facts
Plaintiff Scott Jones sued his employer, The Lodge at Torrey Pines
Partnership (the Lodge), and several others, including his supervisor, for
various causes of action under the FEHA, including sexual orientation
harassment in violation of California Government Code section
12940(j)(l ), sexual orientation discrimination in violation of Section
12940(a), and retaliation in violation of Section 12940(h). 2 The trial court
granted summary adjudication for defendant on the harassment cause of
action. 3 The discrimination claim against the Lodge and the retaliation
claim against the Lodge and the supervisor went to the jury, which found
for the plaintiff on both. 4 However, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that nonemployer individuals cannot be personally liable for retaliation under the
FEHA. 5 The court of appeal reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. 6 The
California Supreme Court granted review to determine "whether an
individual may be held personally liable for retaliation under the FEHA."7
Analysis
The retaliation subdivision ofthe FEHA provides that it is an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate against a person for opposing
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practices prohibited under the act. 8 In Reno v. Baird, the Court held that,
under the discrimination provision of the FEHA9 , individual employees
may not be held liable for unlawful discrimination. 10 The plaintiff in Jones,
however, argued that the different language in subdivision (h) warranted a
different rule. 11 Subdivision (a) makes it an unlawful employment practice
for "an employer" to discriminate, while subdivision (h) makes it unlawful
for an "employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person" to
retaliate. 12 The plaintiff argued that, because subdivision (h) contains the
word "person," while subdivision (a) does not, the plain language indicates
that individual employees may be personally liable for retaliation. 13
The Court found that more than one interpretation of subdivision (h)
was possible. 14 The statutory language, the Court said, was much less clear
than subdivision (j), which explicitly makes an "employee" subject to
personal liability for harassment. 15 The FEHA undercuts the difference
between subsections (a) and (h) by defining "employer" under both as "any
person acting as an agent of an employer .... " 16 In Reno, however, the
Court said that this definition was intended only to ensure that employers
would be liable for discrimination by their agents. 17 Similarly, the Court
here stated that the Legislature may not have intended the word "person" in
subdivision (h) to make individuals personally liable for retaliation. 18
The Court also relied on Reno's rationale for distinguishing between
harassment, for which individuals may be held personally liable, and
discrimination, for which they may not. 19 Harassment claims, the Court in
Reno stated, arise from conduct that may be avoided because it is guided by
personal motives, while discrimination claims arise from conduct that
cannot be avoided because it is within the necessary scope of one's job
performance. 20 In addition, the FEHA exempts small employers from
liability for discrimination, but not harassment. 21 Therefore, the Court said,
it would be "incongruous" to hold individual non-employers liable for
discrimination. 22 This result would also create a conflict of interest, the
Court stated, because the employee would choose the course of action least
likely to lead to a discrimination suit against her rather than choosing the

8 CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12940(h).
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§ 12940(a).
Jones, 177 P.3d at 235 (citing Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333 (1998)).
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best course of action for her employer. 23 Finally, the Court found that
imposing liability on individuals would add little to enhance the prospect of
the victim's recovery because assessing individual blame for discrimination
is harder, when decisions are often made collectively, than assigning blame
on the entity as a whole. 24 The Court concluded that all of these reasons for
exemption to non-employer individuals for personal liability in
discrimination claims apply equally to retaliation claims. 25
The Court also found the absence of legislative history behind the
inclusion of the word "person" in subdivision (h) significant. 26 The Court
explained that the Legislature intended the amendment, which added the
word "person to subdivision (h), only as a "technical and conforming
change" to the FEHA. 27 Further, the Court stated, this amendment
encountered little opposition during the legislative process. 28 The Court
reiterated the Court of Appeal's observation that "[i]t is difficult to imagine
that legislation that would have [created individual liability for retaliation
where none had existed] could properly be characterized as
noncontroversial. "29 The Court also stated that it was "highly unlikely that
the Legislature would make such a significant change in the [potential
liability of individuals] without so much as a passing reference to what it
was doing. "30
Holding
The Court held that, while employers continue to be subject to liability
for retaliation under the FEHA, non-employer individuals may not be
subject to personal liability for their role in that retaliationY
Dissent
Justice Werdegar argued that the plain meaning of Section 12940(h) is
to hold any person who retaliates liable for that action. 32 The majority's
opinion, he said, undermined the purpose of the FEHA. 33 Furthermore, he
said, it is not for the Court to say "[w]hether personal liability in these
circumstances is more or less efficacious in reducing or eliminating
workplace discrimination .... " 34
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Dissent
Justice Moreno argued that, because Section 12940(h) includes the
word "person", the meaning is clear and the inquiry should end. 35
Evaluating the wisdom of imposing personal liability on individuals who
retaliate, he said, is for the legislature to decide, not the courts. 36 The
majority's decision, he said, allows an individual who commits harassment
under Section 12940(j) to be subject to personal liability for that
harassment, but not for retaliation intended to discourage attempts to report
such harassment. 37 This, he said, creates an incentive for the person who
committed the harassment to retaliate. 38 He said that the Legislature could
not have intended such a "perverse and irrational result." 39
Justice Moreno also argued that Reno was distinguishable because the
retaliation subdivision significantly adds "person," whereas the
discrimination subdivision does not. 4° Furthermore, he said, in Reno the
Court found that the term, "employer" in the discrimination subdivision
incorporated respondeat superior principles. 41 However, the retaliation
subdivision uses both the terms, "employer" and "person."42 It would be
incorrect, he said, to argue that the word "person" also incorporates
respondeat superior principles when the term, "employer" clearly does so. 43
Legal Significance
As a result of this decision, non-employer individuals in the workplace
may stand confident that they will not be personally liable for their role in
retaliation under the FEHA. Given the court's recognition that retaliation
claims are closer in similarity to discrimination claims under the FEHA,
non-employer individuals will not be subjected to personal liability for
claims arising from workplace retaliation.
However, employers remain subject to personal liability for claims of
retaliation and both employers and non-employers may be subject to
personal liability for claims of harassment under the FEHA.
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